Entry and asymmetric lobbying: why governments pick losers by Baldwin, Richard E. & Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric
  
 
 
 
CEP Discussion Paper No 791 
May 2007 
Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: 
Why Governments Pick Losers 
Richard E. Baldwin and Frédéric Robert-Nicoud 
 
 
    
Abstract 
Governments frequently intervene to support domestic industries, but a surprising amount of 
this support goes to ailing sectors. We explain this with a lobbying model that allows for 
entry and sunk costs. Specifically, policy is influenced by pressure groups that incur lobbying 
expenses to create rents. In expanding industries, entry tends to erode such rents, but in 
declining industries, sunk costs rule out entry as long as the rents are not too high. This 
asymmetric appropriability of rents means losers lobby harder. Thus it is not that government 
policy picks losers, it is that losers pick government policy.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Governments that try to pick winners and losers usually choose the latter, according to an old 
adage. Some of the clearest examples of this stylized fact come from trade policy. In the 
United States and Europe, the most protected sectors (agriculture, textiles, clothing, footwear, 
steel, and shipbuilding) have all been in decline for decades. Counterexamples are rare. Even 
when a growing sector gets protection, as did the U.S. semiconductor industry, the protection 
tends to be focused on market segments–like memory chips–in which the domestic industry 
is losing ground. A related phenomenon is the “NIMBY” syndrome (Not in My Back Yard), 
whereby special interest groups seem to fight harder to avoid losses than they do to achieve 
gains.  
In seeking to account for this phenomenon, the natural place to start is with the 
political economy literature. The key approach for our purposes is the “pressure group” or 
lobbying approach that was launched by the classic papers of Stigler (1971) and Peltzman 
(1976) in the context of industrial regulation. This approach subsequently found a natural 
home in the field of international trade after a series of papers showed that it provided 
important insights on why observed trade policy deviates so radically from welfare-
maximizing policies. The path-breaking papers here are Hillman (1982), which took the 
political-support function approach, and Findlay and Wellisz (1982), which introduced the 
tariff-formation function approach. More recently, the pressure-group approach has been 
extended to include more explicit modeling of how lobbying expenditures affect 
policymakers’ choices. Magee et al. (1989) work with a model where political contributions 
influence the outcome of elections, but the dominant model in this literature is now the 
“protection for sale” model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). As Rodrik (1995) notes, the 
great advantage of this model is that it provides clear-cut micro foundations for lobbying and 
its effects in a tractable and fairly general setting.1 
 
1.1. The losers’ paradox  
 
At the heart of the pressure-group approach is the presumption that special interest groups 
(SIGs) who spend the most on lobbying or other political activities are, other things equal, the 
ones that get the most government support. Given this view, the success of sunset industries 
in winning a disproportionate share of government support is paradoxical. After all, 
politicians should value the lobbying dollars of expanding industries as much as those of 
declining industries. Moreover, an industry’s ability to finance lobbying expenditures and its 
interest in obtaining government support should be positively related to its size, employment, 
and/or profitability; one would expect the highest levels of government support in the biggest 
and strongest sectors rather than in ailing sectors. In the same light, the NIMBY syndrome–
observed in issues ranging from the health-care reform to the location of landfill sites–is 
curious because lobbying to reverse losses and lobbying to secure new gains would seem to 
be equally attractive to special interest groups.   
Our paper uses the pressure-group approach–in particular, that of Grossman and 
Helpman (1994)–to account for the surprising amount of support that goes to declining 
industries. Our basic story is simple. Government policy is influenced by pressure groups 
whose lobbying is expensive. Special interest groups spend money in order to create rents 
                                                 
1 See Dixit et al. (1997) for a synthesis of the “Protection For Sale” approach and Baldwin (1987) for a 
generalization. 
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that they can appropriate.2 There is, however, a strong asymmetry in the ability of expanding 
and contracting industries to appropriate the benefits of lobbying.  In an expanding industry, 
policy-created rents attract new entry that erodes the rents.  In the extreme, free and 
instantaneous entry obviates all rents. This is not true in declining industries. Since sunk 
market-entry costs (e.g., unrecoverable investments in product development, training, and 
brand name advertising) create quasi-rents, profits in declining industries can be raised 
without attracting entry as long as the level of quasi-rents does not rise above a normal rate of 
return on the sunk capital. Plainly, an asymmetry in the appropriability of rents implies an 
asymmetric incentive to lobby. The result is that losers lobby harder, so it is not government 
policy that picks losers but rather the losers who pick government policies. A corollary to this 
reasoning accounts for the observed tendency of special interest groups to fight harder to 
avoid losses than they do to win gains.   
 
1.2. Review of the literature 
 
Many explanations of the loser’s paradox have been suggested. One of the earliest and best-
known expositions regards the conservative social welfare function (CSWF) of Corden 
(1974). As Corden introduces it, “any significant absolute reduction in real incomes of any 
significant section of the community should be avoided. … In terms of welfare weights, 
increases in incomes are given relatively low weights and decreases very high weights.” 
Although this sort of government-with-a-heart description may have a good deal of 
explanatory power, it comes close to assuming the answer. Moreover, at least in developed 
nations, governments have a great many policies for redistributing income and cushioning 
shocks (income taxes, unemployment insurance, retraining schemes, etc.) and so, even if 
“caring” were a major motive in government policy, an optimizing government would 
separate industry support from pure income distribution considerations. An even more 
important critique is that the conservative social welfare function does not explain why some 
declining industries do not win massive government support. In the 1980s, for instance, the 
real wages of U.S. unskilled workers fell substantially but only a small subset of these 
attracted government support. As the work of Goldberg and Maggi (1999) shows, it was the 
well-organized sectors (e.g., U.S. apparel workers) that induced the US government to adopt 
distortionary policies that softened the fall in their real incomes. In the same spirit as the 
CSWF approach are the equity-concern model of Baldwin (1982) and the status-quo model of 
Lavergne (1983).   
One of the most intuitive explanations for the loser’s paradox turns on Anne 
Krueger’s use of the “identity bias” to account for what she calls “asymmetries in the 
political market.” The bias, according to Krueger (1990), reflects the fact that people care 
more about the welfare of known specific individuals than that of unidentified faceless 
individuals. To see how such a bias could explain asymmetric government support, the author 
contrasts the impact of a subsidy to a declining sector with one to an expanding industry. 
Both subsidies will alter the allocation of employment, but in the ailing industry the jobs 
“saved” are identified ex ante with specific individuals whereas the jobs created in the 
expanding sector cannot be identified with any specific individual, ex ante. In a way, this 
model provides psycho-micro foundations, of the type associated with Schelling (1984), for 
the CSWF approach. As such, Krueger’s explanation relies on the shape of the policymakers’ 
objective function and thus shares the shortcomings of the CSWF solution. Likewise, 
                                                 
2 Using U.S. data, Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) provide some evidence that protection is indeed ‘for 
sale’. See note 5. 
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Rotemberg (2003) proposes a theory in which a small degree of voter altruism in direct and 
representative democracies alike yields protection to import-competing sectors in which the 
level of income of the sector-specific factor is low. 
A related paper that relies on more standard microeconomic behavior is Fernandez 
and Rodrik (1991). These authors use a mechanism that is related to the notion of identity 
bias in order to account for the reluctance of governments to adopt changes in policies (i.e., 
reforms). To see this, consider a simple economy with 45% of workers in one sector, 55% in 
another, and a hypothetical reform that will help workers in the initially small sector and hurt 
those in the initially big sector. Moreover, the reform will shift employment so that 60% of 
workers are eventually in the sector that is helped—that is, the sector that was initially small. 
If each worker knew what her fate would be ex ante, then the reform would easily garner 
support from a majority of workers. However, workers in the initially larger sector do not 
know ex ante in which sector they will end up ex post; the probability that they move to the 
helped sector is quite small, just 15/55, so each one of them may oppose the reform ex ante. 
Observe that, although the identity bias operates via the psychology of policymakers in the 
Krueger model, the Fernandez–Rodrik model relies on nothing more than individual 
rationality and the assumption of a random selection device.  
Another solution to this puzzle that displays solid microfoundations is proposed by 
Hillman (1989), who views the use of trade policy as a "social insurance" against exogenous 
changes in comparative advantage; this model could account for the asymmetric protection of 
losers. Although it is difficult to discern the underlying forces in their model, Magee et al. 
(1989) also claim to explain asymmetric protection with their "compensation effect." 
Sauré (2005) argues that subsidies to importing industries represent a crucial piece in 
trade agreements. If free trade leads to complete specialization then each country has an 
incentive to set tariffs that improve its own terms of trade, making the free-trade agreement 
not enforceable. Subsidies reduce the incentive to engage in a trade war: by subsidizing their 
own comparative-disadvantaged industries, countries limit one another’s abilities to 
manipulate world prices in their favor. In contrast, we emphasize the role of lobbying and the 
role of asymmetric shocks at the sectoral level (e.g., a surge in imports rather than the level of 
imports per se) in explaining asymmetric protection.  
Another line of research that is tangentially related to the losers’ paradox is the study 
of the collapse of senescent industry. The seminal papers, Hillman (1982) and Cassing and 
Hillman (1986), apply the political-support function approach to understand why declining 
industries continue to decline despite the protection they receive, putting a special emphasis 
on their eventual collapse. Subsequent important contributions include Matsuyama (1987), 
Van Long and Vousden (1991), and Brainard and Verdier (1997). Although this branch of the 
literature is also concerned with sunset sectors, its focus is quite different in that it takes as a 
starting point the fact that declining industries will receive protection; our paper seeks to 
understand why this is so.3  
The main idea in our model is based on an unpublished manuscript by one of the 
authors, Baldwin (1993), but our paper differs significantly in its modeling strategy and in the 
rigor of its analysis. Baldwin (1993) relied on unanticipated but permanent changes in the 
degree of foreign competition to generate differences between winners and losers, not 
                                                 
3 Many of these papers also continue to conjecture why declining rather than expanding industries so frequently 
garner government support, but this is not their main focus. In particular, Brainard and Verdier (1997) suppose 
that credit constraints prevent an expanding sector from investing in the lobbying it needs to get protection. 
Also, Hillman (1989) discusses the asymmetrical effects of entry, but they are not incorporated into his formal 
model. 
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explicitly allowing for the simultaneous existences of both types.4 This paper generalizes 
Baldwin (1993) by using a model in which different industries face idiosyncratic temporary 
demand shocks, agents are forward looking, and policy setting is intertemporal. We also note 
that Grossman and Helpman (1996) extended the basic asymmetric lobbying framework of 
Baldwin (1993) by considering the free riding of new entrants in “winning” sectors. Their 
main argument is that it is free riding rather than entry that causes the asymmetry; we shall 
revisit this issue. 
It is worth stressing that our proposed solution based on sunk-cost is complementary 
to all the aforementioned solutions.  
 
1.3. Empirical studies of the losers’ paradox  
 
The lobbying success of losers–the losers’ paradox–has been extensively documented 
empirically. In the United States, Hufbauer and Rosen (1986), Hufbauer et al. (1986), and 
Ray (1991) have documented that declining industries receive a disproportionate share of 
protection. Particularly favored industries are agriculture, textiles, footwear, clothing, and 
steel, all of which have experienced secular declines in employment and GDP shares in the 
United States. In their introduction, Hufbauer and Rosen (1986) write:  
 
With bipartisan regularity, American presidents since Franklin D. Roosevelt have 
proclaimed the virtues of free trade. They have inaugurated bold international 
programs to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers. But almost in the same breath, most 
presidents have advocated or accepted special measure to protect problem industries. 
... The United States is not the only country to have experienced competition in 
mature industry from foreign goods. Most industrial countries, in Europe, Japan and 
elsewhere, have encountered similar difficulties. 
 
More directly related to our issue, many econometric studies have found that being a “loser” 
in terms of employment, output, or import competition actually helps an industry get more 
protection. Baldwin (1985) and Baldwin and Steagall (1994) find a strong correlation 
between positive "serious injury" findings of the U.S. International Trade Commission and 
reduced industry profits and employment. Glismann and Weiss (1980) find that above-trend 
income increases are correlated with reduced protection in Germany between 1880 and 1978. 
Marvel and Ray (1983) find that an industry’s growth rate has a negative impact on its level 
of protection. This is confirmed by Baldwin’s (1985) finding that the industries most 
successful at resisting tariff cuts in the Tokyo Round were characterized by, inter alia, 
relatively slow or negative employment growth as well as by high and rising import 
penetration ratios. More recently, econometric evidence from Ray (1991) shows that 
declining industries tend to get more protection and Trefler (1993) finds that an increase in 
import penetration tends to increase the level of protection a sector is afforded.5 Furthermore, 
a number of econometric studies have found that average tariff levels tend to rise in 
recessions (see e.g. Ray 1987; Hansen 1990; O’Halloran 1994). Gallarotti (1985) finds 
                                                 
4 The novel mechanism we are proposing in this paper combines negative shocks and the importance of sunk 
entry costs within a given industry. Marceau and Smart (2003) propose a theory in which sectors that rely 
heavily on sunk costs are more successful in obtaining tax breaks. 
5 Interestingly, Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), who explicitly test the Grossman-Helpman framework 
using cross-industry data on the coverage ratio of U.S. non-tariff barriers coverage ratios and US lobbying 
spending, find a negative relationship between import penetration and the level of protection when the sector is 
not organised; this relationship is positive otherwise.  
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similar results concerning U.S. tariffs in the 19th and 20th centuries. In a similar light, the 
time-series approach of Bohara and Kaempfer (1991) shows that tariffs are Granger-caused 
(positively) by unemployment and real GNP. In ongoing work on U.S. data, Baldwin et al. 
(2006) regress lobbying expenditure on the interaction between negative demand shocks and 
measures of “sunk-ness” of capital (in addition to a group of controls) and some 
specifications report a positive coefficient in line with theory. Interestingly, the coefficient of 
demand shocks alone is not significant in a statistical sense; it is only when interacted with a 
measure of sunk-ness that demand shocks become significant. 
We also note that the systematic favoring of losers is actually inscribed in 
international and national trade laws. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
generally prohibits countries from pursuing policies that favor domestic firms over foreign 
firms. The major exceptions to this principle (safeguards, dumping duties, and countervailing 
duties) involve situations where imports cause or threaten to cause material injury to an 
established industry. In contrast, there are no general exceptions that allow a country to 
promote the interests of an expanding industry. These principles can also be found in national 
laws. For example, U.S. trade laws make “decline” (appropriately interpreted) an explicit 
requirement for trade protection.  
If one accepts the view that political economy forces shape national and international 
trade laws, then the foregoing asymmetry is puzzling. Lobbying dollars of expanding 
industries should be just as welcomed by politicians as the dollars of declining industries. It is 
therefore odd that politicians should have adopted laws that greatly restrict their ability to 
promote profits in expanding sectors even as they create loopholes that boost the profits of 
declining industries.  
 
1.4. Plan of the paper 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the static economic and political-
economic model. Section 3 introduces the dynamic structure of the model and solves the 
game allowing for entry. Section 4 considers two extensions, and Section 5 summarizes the 
results of the paper and discusses some of the policy implications of our analysis.  
 
 
2. The basic model 
 
Formalization of the asymmetric lobbying effects discussed in the Introduction requires a 
model that first shows how industry support affects the fortunes of firms that may lobby and 
then connects these changing fortunes to the political decision-making process. Toward this 
end we present a simple model whose special features simplify the algebra; we shall argue, 
however, that the basic results in the paper do not qualitatively depend upon these special 
features. In particular, we combine a standard monopolistic competition model (which can be 
thought of as the closed economy version of a “new” trade model à la Flam and Helpman 
1987) with the lobbying model of Grossman and Helpman (1994).6   
                                                 
6 Typically, the new political economy literature works with a Ricardo–Viner model. In our model, since capital 
investments are sunk, it follows that capital is sector specific, like in the Ricardo–Viner framework. In contrast 
to that framework, however, neither the returns to the factor that is mobile across sectors (labor) nor the returns 
to the factors specific to other sectors are affected by the shocks or by the protection granted to a sector in 
particular. This is a consequence of the quasi-general equilibrium nature of our model which features quasi-
linear preferences and a constant-return-to-scale numéraire sector that uses labor only. 
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2.1. Tastes and technology 
 
Consider an economy with 1M +  sectors. The “plus one” sector uses labor L to produce a 
homogenous good A under constant returns and perfect competition. By choice of units, one 
unit of L produces one unit of A. There is also a large number M of symmetric industrial 
sectors that are characterized by increasing returns and monopolistic competition. A typical 
firm faces variable costs equal to βwx, where x is the firm output, β is the unit labor 
requirement, and w is the wage. In this section, to fix ideas we take the number of firms as 
given, delaying considerations of entry to Section 3. When entry is allowed, we assume that a 
new manufacturing firm needs to sink one unit of capital in order to operate, with this capital 
produced by using L only.  
Instantaneous utility is linear in the consumption of A and a two-tier index of 
industrial goods consumption: 
(1) / 1 1/ 1/(1 1/ )
1 0
ln , ( d ) ,m
NM
m m m m mjm j
U A D D N c jχ σ σ σα − − −= == + ≡∑ ∫  
and σ>1. Here Dm is the CES (constant elasticity of substitution) consumption index for a 
typical industrial sector m, cmj is the consumption of variety j in sector m, Nm is the number 
(mass) of such symmetric varieties within a typical sector, σ is the constant elasticity of 
substitution among varieties, and αm is a demand shift parameter. The number of 
differentiated product sectors M is fixed. 
Note that the inclusion of the parameter χ makes the CES aggregate Dm more general 
than the usual functional form. The parameter χ measures the preference for diversity. In the 
standard love-for-variety preferences, χ is taken to be zero, implying that consumers could 
become unboundedly happy by consuming an infinitely small amount of infinitely many 
varieties. To avoid this feature and to simplify our algebraic expressions, we neutralize the 
love-of-variety aspect by taking χ=1.  
Importantly, we assume random preferences in the following sense: αm is either αH or 
αL, where αH>αL; that is, each sector faces either high or low demand.7  
 The model features a continuum of consumers endowed with a share–equal to s(i) for 
consumer i–of the economy’s labor and of all firms’ equities, so that the individual budget 
constraint is 
(2)  
0
1 1
( )( ) d ,m
M M N
m A i m mj mjj
m m
s i wL T p A p c jτ== =+ Π − = +∑ ∑∫  
where Πm is the total operating profit from all sector-m firms, L is the economy wide labor 
endowment, T is the total lump-sum tax collected, and τ is an ad valorem tax or subsidy factor 
(i.e., the rate is τ –1, which is a tax if positive or a subsidy if negative). Producer prices are 
denoted as p, so consumer prices are τp (τ is fully passed on to consumers under Dixit–
Stiglitz monopolistic competition).  
We normalize the economy’s total labor endowment to unity.8 Hence the optimal 
aggregate demand for a typical variety j in a typical sector m and the aggregate demand for A 
and are respectively given by 
                                                 
7 Our qualitative results would hold if we assumed technology shocks rather than demand shock (more on this in 
Section 4.2). 
8 Accordingly, we assume that Σmαm is small enough that production of A is always positive at equilibrium. 
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(3) 
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As usual, the producer price pmj of a typical industrial firm j is related to marginal 
costs according to the expression pmj(1-1/σ) = βw. By choice of units (viz. β = 1-1/σ) and 
taking L as numéraire, we can without loss of generality set pmj = 1 for all firms in all M 
sectors. Consequently, a typical firm’s flow of operating profit is given by9  
(4)  , { , },mm m L H
m mN
απ α α αστ= ∈  
and Πm ≡ Nm πm is total operating profit in sector m (within-sector symmetry allows us to 
drop the firm subscript). Using the ex ante symmetry of sectors, it proves convenient to index 
sectors by the state of demand faced, denoting the Π earned by those facing high and low 
demand as ΠH and ΠL, respectively; clearly ΠH > ΠL for any given level of τm.  
 
2.2. Utilitarian benchmark 
 
In the sequel we shall introduce a political process governing the choice of τ, but intuition is 
served by first identifying the socially optimal τ. Specifically, the government chooses sector-
specific taxes (τ>1) or subsidies (τ<1) to maximize aggregate welfare as measured by a scalar 
a/(1+a) times the sum of consumers’ utility.10 The A-sector is untaxed and the lump-sum tax 
T is adjusted to maintain a balanced budget. By symmetry of firms, the lump-sum tax revenue 
(which may be negative) required to implement the vector τ is just the sum over all m of (1–
τm)Nmcm. Using (4) together with the solutions for T, p, and cm in (1), we find that the 
Benthamite objective is 
(5)  
1
1 1/1 ln( ) , 0,
1
M
m
m
m m m
aW a
a
α σα τ τ=
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤−⎪ ⎪≡ + − >⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥+ ⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭∑  
where we have normalized pA to unity by choice of units of A.11 
Maximizing this with respect to τm for all m requires that the government offsets the 
only distortion in the economy—namely, the monopolistic pricing distortion—and this 
implies that the optimal utilitarian policy is  
(6)  11mτ β σ= ≡ −  
for all M sectors. This result clearly entails a subsidy (τ <1 is a subsidy whereas τ >1 is a tax) 
to all industrial sectors because σ >1. Note also that, since there is only one distortion and 
since lump-sum taxation is possible, the Benthamite government can attain the first-best 
                                                 
9 The result follows by rearranging the firm’s first order condition to (pmi – βw)cmi = pmicmi/σ and then using the 
demand function and symmetry of varieties. 
10 We introduce a (without loss of generality) in order to facilitate comparison with (8), where a is necessary.  
11 See the Appendix A.1. for details of the calculation. 
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outcome. With this utilitarian benchmark in hand, we turn to the lobbying game, where the 
policymaker may be influenced by political contributions.  
 
2.3. Lobbying 
 
Hillman (1989) and Baldwin (1985) point out that, under realistic assumptions, elected 
officials may not be fully aware of the economic interests of their constituents,  and their 
constituents may not be familiar with all the policies (and their economic consequences) 
championed by their elected representatives. Consequently, as Baldwin (1985) notes, a group 
of voters "may have to engage in time-consuming and costly lobbying activities to bring its 
viewpoint to the attention of legislators.  Similarly office-seekers need funds to inform the 
voters of how they have served them or will do so in the future." The so-called pressure–
group model (or lobbying model) developed by Olson (1965) and others focuses on the costs 
and benefits of lobbying and its impact on policy. This class of models abstracts from 
electoral politics, assuming that the government is entrenched or at least that every elected 
government will react in the same way to lobbying.   
Explicit consideration of such imperfections would require a model that is much more 
complicated than the one needed to examine the basic logic of asymmetric lobbying. Thus, 
following standard practice (see e.g. the political support function approach of Hillman 1989 
and the formal lobbying approach of Findlay and Wellisz 1982), we skip the micro modeling 
of how lobbying funds influence policy choices. Instead, we follow the approach in 
Grossman and Helpman's seminal 1994 paper in which lobbying expenditures in the form of 
“contributions” are just assumed to directly enter the objective function of the government.  
Specifically, we follow Grossman and Helpman (1994) as simplified in Baldwin and 
Robert-Nicoud (2006); that is, we model lobbying as a menu auction (Bernheim and 
Whinston 1986) and we assume that all industrial sectors are perfectly organized in the 
Grossman–Helpman sense (i.e., all firms in a sector act as one when it comes to political 
contributions).  Contributions made by sector m are denoted as Cm. Consumers and the 
untaxed A-sector are unorganized and thus do not lobby.  
 
Government’s objective, lobbies, and contributions 
 
As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), the government’s objective function Ω is a weighted 
sum of lobby contributions and aggregate social welfare W:  
 (7)  
1
1 ; {0,1}, {0,1} ,
1
M
m m m m m
m
W G I C G I m
a =
Ω = + ∈ ∈ ∀+ ∑  
where the first term /(1 )W aU a= +  is the utilitarian social welfare function from (5) and 
where the second term represents total political contributions. The binary variable Gm reflects 
the fact that the government always has the option of rejecting contributions from any sector, 
and the binary variable Im reflects the lobbying choice of a particular sector (Im = 0 implies no 
lobbying).12 By way of interpretation, note that a pure Benthamite government would be 
characterized by a=∞ and a pure “Leviathan” by a = 0, so a captures the extent to which 
governments care about social welfare as opposed to political contributions. Mitra (1999) 
                                                 
12 In our model, at equilibrium the government will always accept contributions. In a setting where lobbies’ 
interests are correlated and where the elected candidate bargains with the lobbies, Felli and Merlo (2006) show 
that the elected candidate sets Gm = 0 for some m at equilibrium. 
 9
adds a lobby formation stage to the Grossman–Helpman setting. He assumes an exogenous 
fixed cost of getting organized, which differs across sectors, and studies how this affects the 
equilibrium outcome. By contrast, we assume that the fixed cost of lobbying is zero for all m, 
and we endogenize the decision to lobby actively or not. This decision is taken according to 
an external factor that has nothing to do with an exogenous cost of lobbying per se.  
The vectors τ and G are the government’s choice variables. Lobbies contribute in 
order to induce the government to deviate from the utilitarian first-best outcome. As in the 
Grossman–Helpman model, we restrict contributions to be globally “truthful”. Thus, if an 
industrial sector m decides to lobby (i.e. Im = 1) then its contribution is Cm(τ) = Πm(τ)–Bm, 
where Bm is a scalar; if it decides not to contribute (i.e. Im = 0) then Cm(τ) = 0 for all τ.13 Here 
B is the vector of which Bm is a typical element. 
 
The all-lobby outcome 
 
An equilibrium in this world is defined by the government’s strategy (i.e., the vectors τ and 
G) and the M-sectors’ strategies (i.e. the vectors I and B) that are mutual best responses. The 
payoff function of a typical sector m is Πm–Bm. The government’s payoff function can be 
written as 
(8)  
1 1
11 ln( ) ( ),
1 1
M M
m m
m m m m
m mm m m
a I G B
a a
α αβα τ τ τ σ= =
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪Ω ≡ + − + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥+ +⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭∑ ∑  
where we have used equations (4) and (5) and the fact that contributions are truthful. 
We shall calculate the B–values later. Taking them as given for the moment, we 
investigate what policy would be chosen if a typical sector chooses to make contributions and 
the government chooses to accept them (i.e., if Im = Gm = 1 for all m). In this politically 
influenced case, the typical element of τ that maximizes (8) can be shown to be 
(9)  .mm
I
a
τ β σ= −  
Three remarks are in order. First, recalling that β≡1-1/σ is the first-best subsidy, the 
subsidy in the lobbying equilibrium equals the utilitarian benchmark only when the 
government is benevolent (a = ∞) or when no group contributes (Im = 0 for all m). Second, (9) 
shows that the acceptance of contributions induces the government to subsidize a sector 
beyond the social welfare maximizing level. This allows the sector to sell more as it 
continues to price monopolistically. Third, as a result of the government payoff  functional 
form, each sector’s τm depends only on the sector-specific organization variables and 
parameters, with the subsidy decreasing in the profit margin 1/σ and decreasing in the 
parameter a that measures the government’s concern for social welfare.14  
Characterization of the equilibrium is facilitated because the government’s 
participation constraint is binding only in equilibrium (as usual in the Grossman–Helpman 
approach). Thus, the B–values are chosen by lobbies to make the government just indifferent 
between allowing τ to be influenced by accepting contributions and choosing its outside 
option, which is to refuse contributions from a sector and set that sector’s subsidy to the 
                                                 
13 Locally truthful strategies are the only ones to survive the “coalition proofness” refinement introduced in 
Bernheim et al. (1987). 
14 This is because of the additively separable preferences; generally, all parameters would be relevant. 
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utilitarian optimum described in (6). That is, assuming all other sectors are lobbying and 
contributing, sector m’s contribution (which equals Πm–Bm) must be large enough to make 
the government indifferent between accepting its contribution (i.e., choosing Gm = 1 (and thus 
setting τm = β –1/aσ) and refusing its contribution (i.e., choosing Gm = 0 and thus setting τm = 
β). In symbols, the equilibrium Bm must satisfy 
(10) 
* (ln ) (ln 1)
1 1/ 1/
1 [ ] 0,
1
dev m m
m
m m
a
a a a
B
a
α αβα β σ β σ β
⎡ ⎤Ω −Ω ≡ − − −⎢ ⎥+ − −⎣ ⎦
+ Π − =+
  
where Πm is evaluated at τm = β –1/aσ. Here Ω* is the government’s payoff in the all-lobby 
outcome–namely, (8) evaluated at τi = β –1/aσ for all i with all sectors contributing–and Ωdev 
is the government’s payoff when all sectors except sector m contribute (i.e., when τi =β –1/aσ  
and Gi = 1 for all i but m, and Gm = 0, and τm = β).  
 
The Nash equilibrium 
 
In order to show that the all-lobby outcome is a Nash equilibrium with (9) giving the 
equilibrium τ –values, we show that a typical sector gains from lobbying when its 
contribution is large enough to induce the government to accept it. The informal argument is 
quite simple. A sector’s contribution induces the government to choose a policy that–
although suboptimal from the utilitarian perspective–transfers money from consumers to 
firms. To respect the participation constraint, a sector’s net contribution need only 
compensate the government for the reduction in social welfare (i.e., the reduction in the W 
part of Ω). Because the social welfare loss is of second order while the transfer is of first 
order, all sectors will indeed find it in their interests to contribute. Finally, the government is 
(by construction) just indifferent to deviating from the equilibrium, so its strategy of 
accepting contributions is Nash. Observe that since the inequality is independent of the state 
of demand, it follows that both high and low demand sectors would lobby. We summarize 
this intermediate result as follows. 
 
Result 1: When entry is impossible, the outcome where all sectors lobby regardless of the 
state of demand is part of a Nash equilibrium. In this all-lobby outcome, the levels of 
subsidies are given by (9). Moreover, the outcome where lobbying is done only by sectors 
facing low demand is not a Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proof. The proof of this result boils down to the proof of a simple proposition. By 
construction, the equilibrium B–values are set to induce the government to accept all 
contributions, and so all we need to show is that a typical sector will want to lobby. To this 
end, two facts are useful: (i) τm equals β–1/aσ  if sector m lobbies and equals β otherwise; 
and (ii) operating profit is decreasing in τm (i.e. increasing in the subsidy rate 1–τm). Given 
these facts, a sector can gain from lobbying provided that the contribution it must pay to the 
government is sufficiently low. Specifically, denoting the sector-m operating profit function 
as Πm[⋅], the net profit from lobbying must exceed the net profit from not lobbying: Πm[β–
1/aσ] – Cm > Πm[β]. Given that contributions are truthful, our task is then to show that Bm > 
Πm[β].   
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The Nash equilibrium Bm is determined by (10), which–using (4) and (9)–can be 
written as 
(11) / 1ln( ) ln( ) 1 , * .
* * *
m m m
m mB a a
α α α σβα τ βτ τ β τ σ
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎤= − − − + ≡ −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
 
Equation (4) implies that Πm[β] = αm/σβ, so lobbying is worthwhile to sectors if the 
following inequality holds: 
(12) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1(ln ln ) ( ) ( )
1 * * *
0.
m
a
a a
α βτ β τ β σ τ β
⎡ ⎤∆ ≡ − − − + −⎢ ⎥+ ⎣ ⎦
>
 
Observe that either the inequality holds for sectors facing both low and high states of 
demand, or else it does not hold for any sector.  
Because of the log functions’ concavity, ln(1/τ*) – ln(1/β) exceeds τ*(1/τ* – 1/β). 
Substituting this into (12) and rearranging terms, we see that ∆ is greater than something that 
equals zero: 
1 1 1( * )( ) 0.
1 *m
a
a a
α τ β σ τ β∆ > − + − =+  
The right-hand side equals zero by definition of τ*; see (11).  
Finally, this reasoning shows that any equilibrium in which some sectors are not 
lobbying fails to be a Nash equilibrium because each sector would unilaterally gain from 
lobbying. QED.  
 
 
3. Entry and the incentive to lobby 
 
We now extend the model to continuous time and allow the number of firms in a typical 
sector to be determined via free entry.  
 
3.1. Additional assumptions 
 
The representative agent maximizes her lifetime utility, which is assumed to be additively 
separable and equal to
0
drt
t
e U t
∞ −
=∫ , where U is as in (1) and r > 0 is the discount rate. The 
representative agent can choose either to consume her income or to invest it in shares of new 
firms. Preferences are random; the switching between αL and αH is governed by a symmetric 
Markov process (see Table 1). 
Creation of a new industrial firm in any of the M sectors entails a fixed cost consisting 
of one unit of capital (this cost reflects market entry costs as in Baldwin’s (1988) model). 
One unit of capital is produced from F units of labor under conditions of perfect competition, 
so the entry cost equals F. Importantly, this capital is sunk in the following sense: once a unit 
of capital is built, it must be either employed in the sector in which it was invested or 
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abandoned (since all consumers are identical, no firms will be sold in equilibrium). In 
addition, capital does not depreciate.15  
Our next task is to characterize the entry decision. 
 
Table 1: The Markov transition matrix 
 
3.2. Entry 
 
Entry, as usual, is assumed to occur instantaneously and up to the point where the equilibrium 
value of firms is no greater than the entry cost F. Owing to the stochastic demand, a single 
firm will have different values depending on the current state of demand (high versus low).  
 
Value of the firms at steady-state 
 
The value V of a typical firm in a typical sectoris the discounted value of operating profits net 
of any lobbying contribution.16 By symmetry, there are only two levels of V: one for firms 
belonging to low-demand sectors, VL, and one for firms belonging to high-demand sectors, 
VH. Specifically, 
(13) 
[ ]
[ ]
d d (1 d ) , ( ) / ,
d d (1 d ) , ( ) / ,
rdt
L L H L L L L L
rdt
H H L H H H H H
V b t e tV t V b I C N
V b t e tV t V b I C N
λ λ
λ λ
−
−
= + + − = Π −
= + + − = Π −  
where we omit the time and sector subscripts since these values are constant at steady state 
and since sectors face either high or low demand. Note that the values for b (a mnemonic for 
benefit) are the per-firm operating profit net of any contributions, so bi = Bi/N, for i = H, L. 
These equations are easy to interpret. For VL, the value of a firm in state L at time t is 
equal to the current flow of net profits plus the expected discounted value it will have at time 
t+dt: with probability λdt it will move to state H and with probability 1-λdt it will remain in 
state L. The value VH is defined analogously. In the limit of continuous time as dt→0, by 
symmetry among industries and firms within industries we have, after rearranging: 
                                                 
15 Adding depreciation is uncomplicated (see Section 4.3) but is not necessary here. 
16 As a special feature of our functional forms, total operating profit per sector is independent of the number of 
firms per sector; the key point is that V is diminishing in N.  
 
Transition probabilities  
αL αH 
αL 1–λdt λdt 
αH λdt 1–λdt 
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(14)  
( ), ( )
( ) ( ), .
( 2 ) ( 2 )
L L H L H H H L
L H H L
L H
rV b V V rV b V V
r b b r b bV V
r r r r
λ λ
λ λ λ λ
λ λ
= + − = − −
⇔
+ + + += =+ +
 
The first two expressions are standard asset-pricing equations: r times the expected 
value of the firm must equal the sum of the current flow of net profits and the expected 
capital gain. The latter two expressions are the solutions for each V in terms of b. 
Because the cost of entry is F, free-entry requires that the steady state number of firms 
per sector rises until the maximum value of a typical firm equals F. A firm’s value may differ 
between high– and low–demand states; hence the entry condition is 
 (15)  subject to max{ , } .H LN V V F=  
Note that U in (1) is quasi-linear, so the transition dynamics are degenerated. That is, 
Nm jumps to its steady-state value N* as soon as αm = αH. (It jumps to some N0 < N if αm = αL 
initially, as we shall explain).  
 
3.3. The only-losers-lobby equilibrium 
 
We assert that the outcome in which only sectors facing low demand lobby is a Markov 
perfect equilibrium (MPE), and we refer to it as the “only losers lobby” (OLL) outcome. In 
this dynamic version of the model, the state variables are (i) N, the number (mass) of firms in 
a typical sector–a number that is influenced by players’ actions via free entry–and (ii) α, the 
vector of the states of demand facing each sector. Given our simple setup, a sector’s strategy 
can be summarized by its decision on whether or not to lobby, with this action possibility 
depending upon the state of demand. Formally, the OLL equilibrium can be expressed as the 
set of sector strategies such that 
(16)  
0 if ,
1 if .
m H
m
m L
I
α α
α α
=⎧= ⎨ =⎩
 
Here Im = 1 or Im = 0 indicates that sector m is or (respectively) is not lobbying. Note 
that since there is irreversible entry and since Dixit–Stiglitz monopolistic competition never 
produces negative operating profit (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977), the number of firms that are 
active in each sector is constant in steady state. This and symmetry of firms allows us to drop 
the sector subscript from the N–terms. In this outcome, the values of a typical firm are 
(17)   
( ) ( ), ;
( 2 ) ( 2 )
1 ( ), .
( 1/ )
OLL OLLL H H L
L H
L H
L H
b r b b r bV V
r r r r
b B b
N a N
λ λ λ λ
λ λ
α α
σ β σ σβ
+ + + += =+ +
= − =−
 
The superscript “OLL” is used to denote the value of firms in sectors implementing 
the only–losers–lobby strategies. 
To demonstrate that the OLL outcome is an MPE, it is useful first to establish that, for 
any given N, the value of a firm when it faces low demand is no greater than its value when it 
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faces high demand; that is, OLL OLLL HV V F≤ = . This feature is intuitively obvious and easy to 
establish formally.17   
Figure 1 helps us interpret the equilibrium by plotting values of a typical firm against 
the number of firms per sector. Since competition lowers per-firm value, all lines slope 
downward.  The second and third lines (counting from the top) indicate the only-losers-lobby 
outcome for sectors facing high and low demand. These are marked OLLHV  and 
OLL
LV , 
respectively; the OLLHV  line is above the 
OLL
LV  line. Free entry means that the value of a firm 
can never rise above F, so all the value lines are cut off at the horizontal line at F. Plainly, the 
steady-state number of firms is N* in the OLL outcome. The value of firms facing high 
demand will be F; point 2 gives the value of firms facing low demand.  
 
Establishing the Markov perfect equilibrium 
 
Using the diagram, we can show that the only-losers-lobby outcome is a Markov perfect 
equilibrium. We start with the government. At every time t, the government cannot, by 
construction of B, gain from deviating from the OLL outcome. Thus, accepting contributions 
and providing the politically influenced τ is part of a Nash equilibrium in every subgame and 
in every state of the world. The argument for high-demand sectors is similar. No high-
demand sector could gain from deviating; after all, free entry ensures that the value of a 
typical firm cannot rise above F, so any lobbying effort would be useless. Thus, the strategy 
of no lobbying in high-demand states is Nash in every subgame.  
Finally, low-demand sectors cannot gain from deviating because ceasing to lobby 
would lower their value from point 2 to point 3 in the diagram. More specifically, under this 
deviation the value of a typical firm facing low-demand sector would be 
[λbH+(r+λ)bLdev]/[r(r+2λ)], where bLdev is the per-firm operating profit in the low-demand 
                                                 
17 The proof is by contradiction. If VOLLL > VOLLH  then the free entry condition implies F = VOLLL, so F > VOLLH. 
This in turn implies that the high-demand sector could lobby without attracting entry and so, by Result 1, it 
would. Since this contradicts the definition of the only-losers-lobby outcome, we know that VOLLL ≤ VOLLH  = F. 
This in turn implies bL ≤ bH. 
F
N
VH
AL
VH
OLL
VL
OLL
VL
OLL,dev
N**N*
1
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5
6
€ 
VL
AL=
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0
Figure 1: The free-entry equilibrium
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state when the subsidy is the socially optimal β (i.e., when bLdev = αL/(σβN)). The proof of 
Result 1 showed that one-period lobbying is always worthwhile when it does not change N, 
so we know that { /[ ( 1/ )]}/L Lb B a Nα σ β σ= − + −  exceeds bLdev. Using (14) this tells us that 
not lobbying in the low-demand state would lower the typical firm’s value.  
We summarize these findings in our next result. 
 
Result 2: Because free entry makes lobbying useless for sectors facing their entry margin 
(i.e., for high-demand sectors), the only-losers-lobby outcome is a Markov perfect 
equilibrium. However, firms in sectors facing low demand find their values below entry costs, 
so lobbying can raise their value.  
 
As it turns out, the OLL outcome is not the only MPE, as Grossman and Helpman 
(1996) have pointed out.  
 
3.4. Other equilibria 
 
Starting from N = N*, lobbying in the high state does no good–but neither does it harm firms 
facing high demand. If (for whatever reason) incumbents in a sector with high demand 
actually did lobby, this would induce more entry and thus an increase in the equilibrium 
number of firms to N** in the diagram. It is important to note that , once the new entrants are 
irreversibly in the market, a deviation by cessation of lobbying in the high-demand state 
would lower the value of the firm from point 4 to 5 in the diagram, so no deviation would 
occur in the high-demand state. Likewise, no deviation would occur in the low-demand state, 
so this outcome–what we call the “all lobby” outcome, denoted as “AL” in the diagram–is 
also an MPE. We summarize this as follows: 
 
Result 3: Given free entry, the all-lobby outcome is a Markov perfect equilibrium because, 
once high-demand lobbying has increased the number of active firms, cessation of lobbying 
would lower the value of such firms. As before, sectors facing low demand can raise their 
value by lobbying, so lobbying in both states is also a MPE.  
 
It is possible to arrive at the N = N** state because lobbying in the high-demand state 
starting from N = N* is both useless and costless in terms of incumbent firms’ value in the 
high-demand state. 
 
Dominance of only-losers-lobby MPE 
 
Although this second MPE does exist, there are good reasons for believing that it would 
never occur. The basic argument is that, even though the increase in the number of firms from 
N* to N** does not affect VH, it will lower the value of firms facing low-demand returns. 
Note that the value of a typical firm facing high demand is identical (namely F) in the two 
MPEs, but the value of a typical firm facing low-demand is lower in the all-lobby outcome. 
To see this, observe that from (14) with VH = F, we have VLi equals (bLi+λF)/(r+λ), where i 
denotes either “OLL” (in the only-losers-lobby equilibrium) or “AL” (in the all-lobby 
equilibrium). Since bL is given by (16) with αm = αL and since N** > N*, it is clear that ALLV is 
lower than OLLLV  (these values correspond to points 2 and 6 in the diagram). In short, although 
the lobbying-induced entry has no effect on the value of firms facing high demand, the 
presence of more firms lowers the value of the same firms in the low-demand state. Our next 
result summarizes this reasoning. 
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Result 4:  The only-losers-lobby and all-lobby outcomes are both MPEs, but the former 
dominates the latter in the sense that firms are indifferent between the two when facing high 
demand yet strictly prefer the OLL equilibrium when facing low demand. This makes the 
only-losers-lobby MPE focal. 
 
 
4. Extensions 
 
In this section we consider three extensions of our analysis. We first allow for the possibility 
that new entrants “free ride” on the lobbying contributions by former incumbents for some 
time. We then show that assuming technological shocks yields the same qualitative results as 
in the case of demand shocks described thus far. Finally, we apply our model to sunset 
industries–namely, for the case of permanent adverse shocks.  
 
4.1. Free riding 
 
In the spirit of the Grossman–Helpman lobbying approach, our basic model assumes that all 
firms in a sector are politically perfectly organized in the sense that they act as one when it 
comes to presenting and financing a contribution menu to the government. To deal with 
entry, we extend our basic model in the simplest possible way: by supposing that all entrants 
immediately act as incumbents. This of course is not the only reasonable assumption (see 
Grossman and Helpman 1996 for discussion of the issue) and, as we shall see, relaxing this 
assumption has important implications for Result 3.However, we shall demonstrate that this 
assumption does not alter (and even reinforces) our main result that free entry removes the 
incentive for lobbying in sectors facing their entry margin, since when profits are above the 
standard value they are immediately and successfully grabbed by entrants.  
 
Modeling free riding 
 
To model free riding by entrants, we assume that new firms do not share the financing of 
contributions initially but that they do become perfectly organized (i.e., act identically to 
incumbents) eventually. Specifically, all newly entered firms start as free riders but switch 
into non-free riders (i.e., join the perfectly organized firms) according to a Poisson process 
marked by the hazard rate φ. This switch is synchronized across all entrants in the sense that 
at any given time, new entrants either will all be free riders or will all be non-free riders. 
Furthermore, we assume that the switch to non-free rider status is permanent, so that 
eventually all firms are perfectly organized. Observe that φ provides a natural parameter for 
the extent of the free-riding problem since newcomers are expected to remain free riders for a 
period equal to 1/φ. Our basic model implicitly assumes that φ is infinite. 
We begin by studying the all-lobby outcome, that is, where both high- and low-
demand sectors lobby. Free riding complicates the calculation of the expected value of 
entering because we must take account of the probabilities that (i) the sector sees its demand 
change and (ii) the entrant experiences a shift in its free-riding status. Incumbent firms in this 
case will have one of four possible values: uHV , , uLV , , HV  or LV . These are, respectively, the 
value of an incumbent facing high or low demand when entrants are unorganized (as shown 
by the subscript u) and when the entrants have joined the lobby (as shown by a lack of the 
subscript). 
Three instantaneous probabilities are relevant to an incumbent’s value. These are: 
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(i) the probability that the sector experiences a shift in demand, λdt; 
(ii) the probability that entrants become non-free riders, φdt; 
(iii) the probability that the sector experiences both a change in demand and entrants 
become non-free riders, λφ(dt)2. 
Taking account of these at the limit d 0t → , VH and VL are still determined by (14); the 
expected values of an incumbent in the various states when entrants are unorganized are then 
(18)  , , , , ,
, , , , ,
( ) ( ),
( ) ( ),
H u H u H u L u H u H
L u L u H u L u L u L
rV b V V V V
rV b V V V V
λ φ
λ φ
= − − − −
= + − − −  
where the values of b are the “flow rewards” to incumbents in the various states (see 
Appendix A.2 for computational details).  
The related value equations for entrants are: 
(19)  
( ) ( ),
( ) ( ),
H H H L H H
L L H L L L
rJ J J J V
rJ J J J V
π λ φ
π λ φ
= − − − −
= + − − −  
where JH and JL are the values of free-riding firms when the sector under evaluation is facing 
high and low demand, respectively.  
Since free riders do not contribute to lobbying expenses, the flow benefit of being a 
free rider in both the high and low states of demand exceeds the flow benefit of being an 
incumbent: 
(20)  , ,0, 0,H H u H L L u Lb bπ γ π γ− ≡ > − ≡ >  
where γH and γL are constants. 
The free-entry condition in this extension is JH = F.  
 
Would high-demand incumbents lobby? 
 
In the basic model, incumbents in the high-demand sector were indifferent to lobbying when 
N=N*, since lobbying neither brought them any benefits nor harmed their value. Now we turn 
to evaluating whether high-demand sectors would still be indifferent to lobbying.  
Section 3 established that the value of high-demand incumbents in the only-losers-
lobby outcome was equal to F. To see whether high-demand sectors would be indifferent to 
lobbying, we check whether the value of incumbents at the moment they lobby–that is, at the 
instant of entry when entrants are still free riders, namely VH,u from (18)–is less than F. 
Toward this end we solve (18) and (19) for the values of incumbents in the four possible 
states of the world (high or low demand and entrants free riding or not). The solutions, 
though intuitive, are not especially transparent, but for our purpose we need only consider the 
difference JH–VH,u, which can be written as (see Appendix A.2. for details) 
(21)  ,
( ) .
( )( 2 )
H L
H H u
rJ V
r r
φ λ γ φγ
φ φ λ
+ + +− = + + +  
Given (20), we know that this expression is positive for any finite φ. Moreover, this 
difference tends to zero as φ approaches infinity.  
What this reasoning shows is that, starting from N = N*, incumbents facing high 
demand in the OLL outcome would never agree to lobby if there were any chance that free 
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entrants would free ride, even for an infinitely short time. This result reinforces our assertion 
that the only-losers-lobby outcome is focal.18 
 
4.2. Technology shocks instead of demand shocks 
 
The basic model assumes stochastic preferences in order to generate stochastic demand 
functions. In this section, we show that nothing would change by instead assuming stochastic 
technology. Hence, we assume that the sector-specific marginal costs are random variables 
βm that are independently and identically distributed across sectors. Specifically, 
{(1 1/ ) , (1 1/ ) }m G Bβ σ β σ β∈ − −  for all m, where βG < βB; G is a mnemonic for good and B 
stands for bad. Under Dixit–Stiglitz monopolistic competition and within-sector symmetry, 
the price charged by all sector-m firms is βm/(1-1/σ).  
Moreover, we introduce some substitutability across sectors by assuming that 
preferences are 1 1/ 1/(1 1/ )
1
( ) , 1M mmU A D
θ θ θ− −== + >∑ . Given the law of large numbers, total 
expenditure on sector m’s varieties is  
(22)   
1
1 1
( ) .
( / 2)( )
m m
m m
G G B B
Np c
M
θ
θ θ
τ β
τ β τ β
−
− −= +  
Now redefining αH and αL as equal to the right-hand side of expression (22) evaluated at βm 
equal to (1-1/σ)βG and (1-1/σ)βB, respectively, we note that the relation αH > αL still holds 
and hence all other derivations in the paper carry through unaltered.  
 
4.3. Sunset industries 
 
As we stated in the Introduction, the literature on sunset industries highlights that these 
industries continue to decline despite the protection they receive, assuming they get 
protection in the first place. A simple extension of our model captures this idea; note that our 
model allows for endogenous lobbying decisions, so we do not assume that these industries 
are protected a-priori.19 
We first assume that firms are “dying” at a Poisson rate δ, so that N can decrease as 
well as increase. Next, for simplicity we still assume that the shocks occur on demand. But 
now we assume that once a negative shock has hit industry m (αm = αL), demand will not 
recover. In other words, shocks are permanent (and the cells of the first row of Table 1 now 
contain the numbers 1 and 0, respectively; that is, the low state of the world is an absorbing 
state). Together, these modifications imply that equation (14) must be replaced by  
                                                 
18 The idea here is akin to the “trembling hand” refinement. If incumbents did make a mistake and lobbied in the 
high state, thus raising the number of firms to the point where JH = F, then they would continue to lobby 
because doing otherwise would lower their value even further. This result, however, relies on the lack of exit. If 
firms did exit, a one-time mistake would be corrected eventually. We thank Thierry Verdier for this observation. 
19 In this case also, two Markov perfect equilibria exist: the looser-only-lobby MPE and the all-lobby MPE. 
Using an argument similar to that in Section 3.4, we can claim that the former is focal: VH is equal to F in both 
MPEs, but VL is larger in the former than in the latter. 
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where (as before) VH>VL holds without ambiguity whenever bH>bL. 
The free-entry condition (15) implies VH = F, which once again pins down the 
equilibrium number of firms. We call it N* so that Figure 1 illustrates the present extension 
as well. In particular, we concentrate on the MPE in which only losers lobby. Note that dying 
firms are immediately replaced by new entrants, so N = N* as long as α = αH. 
Consider now what happens when, at some random time T, demand falls permanently 
to αL. At time T, the number of firms N* implies that the value of each firm in the affected 
sector falls to OLLLV F< . In words, despite the fact that firms in this sector are now lobbying, 
their value is smaller than the opportunity cost of capital and so no new firms will enter the 
sector. What is new is that the mass of firms is now decreasing at a rate δ, so that OLLLV  
increases over time (remember that bL = BL/N and that BL is constant). This suggests that N 
and OLLLV  evolve over time as plotted in Figure 2 below.  
Figure 2 plots time on the horizontal axis and, on the vertical axis, plots both the 
number of firms and the value of a typical firm in a representative sunset industry. Assume 
now that this sector is hit by the shock at time T. First, as can be seen in the figure, OLLLV  
“overshoots” at the time of the shock. Second, as the number of firms shrinks over time, OLLLV  
returns to its steady-state value. At time T+∆T, OLLLV F=  is expected to hold again and the 
number of firms no longer changes: N = N0.20 
 
                                                 
20 More formally, for any ε ++∈R  and for any ξ ++∈R , there exists a positive real number T∆  such that 
0 ( )OLLLF V t ε≤ − <  and 00 ( )N t N ξ≤ − <  for all t T T≥ + ∆ . 
20 
Figure 2: Sunset industries 
To capture more fully the idea that the industry is a “sunset industry”, assume now 
that α keeps falling over time at random intervals without ever reaching 0. Namely, the values 
of α now form an infinite sequence 1 2 1 0H J Jα α α α α +≡ > > > > > >L L  and the Markov 
square matrix has now an infinitely countable number of rows and columns with identical 
terms 1 d tλ−  along the main diagonal, λdt in each cell to the left of the main diagonal, and 
zeroes everywhere else. Then N0(α), the steady-state mass of firms given α < αH, keeps 
falling. Note however that N0(α) > 0 for all α > 0. 
This “tomorrow never dies” feature of the model is not the most attractive, but it is a 
direct consequence of the fact that Dixit–Stiglitz  monopolistic competition never produces 
negative operating profits. With more reasonable assumptions, there would exist a threshold 
α, call it α0, at which N0(α0)<0. In such a case, all firms would have leave the sector 
eventually. 
To sum up the results of this section, we observe that a sector hit by a permanent 
shock gets protection at equilibrium; yet despite the protection received, this sector shrinks 
(there is a net exit of firms) over time and, under reasonable assumptions, this sector 
eventually disappears. We remark that the “sunset sector” would have disappeared earlier if it 
could not successfully lobby the government for protection. This suggests that the possibility 
of lobbying entails hysteresis of the production mix at the aggregate level. Since successful, 
growing sectors do not lobby, this might–in a proper general equilibrium model–reduce 
growth or steady-state per capita incomes. (See also Grossman and Helpman 1996 on this 
point.)  
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5. Conclusion 
 
Despite differences in political institutions and laws, declining industries account for the bulk 
of protection granted in all industrialized nations. The GATT also asymmetrically favors 
ailing industries. This asymmetry is curious because selfish governments should be equally 
interested in the lobbying dollars of expanding and declining industries. Our paper provides a 
political equilibrium explanation based on sunk entry costs. We assume that industries spend 
money on lobbying to obtain profit-boosting protection and note a strong asymmetry between 
the appropriability of protection in contracting and expanding industries. In expanding 
industries, rents attract new entrants that erode the rents, but this is not true in ailing 
industries. Sunk entry costs (product development, training, advertising, etc.) allow 
protection to raise profits without attracting entry–as long as profits rise to a value not higher 
than a normal return on sunk capital. Clearly, asymmetric appropriability implies asymmetric 
lobbying, and the result is that losers get most of the protection because losers lobby harder. 
 
Policy implications 
 
The analysis in our paper can also be used to shed light on the social desirability of packaging 
protectionist policies with anti-entry policies (such as a government monopoly or production 
quotas). Such packaging is likely to lead to greater levels of protection because it increases 
the incentives of all industries to lobby for protection. Consider, for instance, an industry that 
is able to organize a cartel that prevents new production and entry. Since entry is impossible, all 
sectors–both expanding and contracting–will find that lobbying generates appropriable rents. 
As Result 1 showed, all sectors will lobby and the overall outcome will be a greater reduction 
in social welfare than would occur without the entry barriers.  
Most OECD countries have laws prohibiting this kind of collusion; however, in 
certain industries such as medicine, the special interest group itself regulates the flow of new 
entrants via control over standards. Labor unions could serve a similar role.  In the basic 
model described here, labor was paid the going wage and all rents accrued to firm owners. 
However, it is easy to imagine a model where an industry-specific labor union manages to 
capture some or all of the rents created by protection. In such a model, the labor unions that 
are able to control the wage of new workers would benefit from higher tariffs in expanding 
industries.  In fact, many countries do (or did) sanction "closed shop" rules that have exactly 
this effect. Alternatively, the fixed setup cost can also be interpreted as investments in human 
capital; under this interpretation, the model would explain why workers with skills specific to 
ailing industries would lobby. 
One obvious policy recommendation derives directly from this analysis. Protectionist 
packages that place controls on domestic entry or production are likely to attract greater 
lobbying efforts and thereby lead to greater deviations from the social optimum. 
Consequently, prohibiting such packaging of policies would lower equilibrium protection 
rates.   
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Appendix 
 
A.1. Deriving equation (5) 
 
In this appendix, we derive the government’s reduced form objective function (5) in the text. 
From the industry demand functions, assuming symmetry of varieties within an industry and 
p = 1 (which itself follows from markup pricing and choice of numéraire and units), we have 
(A.1)  
1/(1 1/ )
1/ 1 1/( ) d .m mm m j
m m m
D N j
N
σ
σ σα α
τ τ
−
− −⎛ ⎞≡ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫  
Hence, the second term in the utility function reduces to  
(A.2)  
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As usual with quasi-linear utility, spending on Ac is a residual and so the total demand 
for A, aggregating over all consumers, is 
(A.3)  1
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Here we have used the balanced budget assumption to define the level of lump sum 
taxation, T. Aggregate consumer income Y equals labor income (i.e., unity) plus all operating 
profits–which, given (4), are equal to the second right-hand term in the expression for Y. 
Combining these elements and using p = 1 yields 
(A.4)  
1 1 1
1 11 1 ( 1) ,
M M M
c m m
m m m
m m mm m m
A N N c
N
α α
σ τ σ τ= = == + − = + −∑ ∑ ∑  
where we have used symmetry to obtain cm = α/(Nmτm) and thus the final expression on the 
right-hand side. Then, combining these expressions for Ac and Dm we obtain expression (5) in 
the text.  
To boost intuition and facilitate graphical representation of the model, it is useful to 
rewrite W as 
(A.5)  
1 1
1 ( ) .
1
M M
m m m m m
m m
aW N D pc
a
α
= =
⎧ ⎫= + Π + −⎨ ⎬+ ⎩ ⎭∑ ∑  
That is to say, indirect utility of consumers (and thus the utilitarian social welfare 
function) is proportional to 1 plus the sum of operating profit plus the sum of consumer 
surplus.  
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A.2. Deriving equation (21) 
 
In order to understand how we derive the expressions in (18), first note that VH,u for any dt 
can be written as 
(A.6)  
d
, , ,
2 2
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d { d d
(d ) [1 d d (d ) ] }.
r t
H u H u L u H
L H u
V b t e V t V t
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−= + +
+ + − − −  
Rearranging and dividing all terms by dt then gives 
(A.7)    
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now, taking the limit dt→0 yields the result in (18).  
The system given by (18) and (19) can be rewritten so as to solve for JH–VH,u and JL–
VL,u –namely, for the differences between the payoff of the free-riders and of the contributors 
in each state: 
(A.8)  ,
,
,H H u H
L L u L
J Vr
J Vr
γφ λ λ
γλ φ λ
−+ + − ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ −− + +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
  
where we have made use of (20). Using Cramer’s rule, it is now easy to derive (21). Note 
also that the term VH–VL does not appear in the system (A.8); rather, it is determined by (14).   
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